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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines some of the central global ethical and governance challenges of climate change and carbon emis-
sions reduction in relation to globalization, the “global financial crisis” (GFC), and unsustainable conceptions of the 
“good life”, and argues in favour of the development of a global carbon “integrity system”. It is argued that a funda-
mental driver of our climate problems is the incipient spread of an unsustainable Western version of the “good life”, 
where resource-intensive, high-carbon western lifestyles, although frequently criticized as unsustainable and deeply 
unsatisfying, appear to have established an unearned ethical legitimacy. While the ultimate solution to climate change 
is the development of low carbon lifestyles, the paper argues that it is also important that economic incentives support 
and stimulate that search: the sustainable versions of the good life provide an ethical pull, whilst the incentives provide 
an economic push. Yet, if we are going to secure sustainable low carbon lifestyles, it is argued, we need more than the 
ethical pull and the economic push. Each needs to be institutionalized—built into the governance of global, regional, 
national, sub-regional, corporate and professional institutions. Where currently weakness in each exacerbates the 
weaknesses in others, it is argued that governance reform is required in all areas supporting sustainable, low carbon 
versions of the good life. 
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1. Introduction 
It is just over a decade since I was first invited to think 
about the ethical and governance problems surrounding 
the issues of global warming—giving the opening key-
note to a world council colloquium on carbon trading. 
The commonly perceived ethical issue at the time was 
that carbon trading would allow developed countries to 
avoid their responsibility for fixing the problem they had 
caused. My views on carbon trading were informed by 
recognizing: 
1) The value of well governed markets and the effec-
tiveness of clear price signals. Putting a price on carbon 
could have dramatic effects on the decisions of consum-
ers, investors and providers of goods and services. How-
ever, through direct experience of currency markets dur-
ing the 1980s, I recognized that market players could 
profit from generating volatility in which they profited at 
the expense of those investing in the provision of goods 
and services.3 
2) That markets involve the trading of property rights 
and the “initial distribution” of those property rights was 
irrelevant in some theories of market operation but vi-
tally important as a matter of ethics and justice. 
3) Economic incentives are an important governance 
tool but, like all governance tools, they are most effective 
as part of a package of ethical standard setting, legal 
regulation and institutional reform and such packages are 
necessary for major reforms to succeed (Sampford, 1990, 
1992). The primary ethical question is not about how the 
economic incentives are activated but the overall value of 
major reforms they seek to secure.  
The conclusions I drew were that: 
1) The fundamental problem was that an unsustainable 
3In promoting volatility, traders benefited at the expense of those who 
needed to exchange currencies to conduct business through a combina-
tion of asymmetric knowledge and outright manipulation. Although 
some risks could be hedged (generating major profits for the market 
players), long term risk was uninsurable. By increasing the risk of doing 
business, it discouraged what would be otherwise profitable investment.
1The “GFC” in popular Australian parlance refers to the “global financial
crisis” which began in 2008. 
2A “Global Carbon Crisis” to parallel the GFC. 
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“high carbon” version of the “good life” had been deve- 
loped in the west and was increasingly sought by the rest.  
2) The wealthiest countries were pressing for carbon 
trading schemes because all such schemes allocated more 
per capita rights to emit to themselves than to others. 
This proposal effectively created property rights in un-
sustainable activities (emitting carbon) and allocated 
most of those to the countries which had already contrib-
uted most to the problem. The outcome of which was 
neither fair nor likely to be agreed by the less developed 
countries. 
3) The wealthiest countries wanted to buy some of 
these limited rights from less developed countries. How-
ever, if the latter still sought high carbon lifestyles the 
extra resources would be expended on high carbon ac-
tivities.  
4) Accordingly, low carbon versions of the good life 
that both the west and the rest wanted to live were essen-
tial to solving global warming. This could be assisted by 
putting a price on carbon (preferably through carbon 
taxes).  
5) Grandfathered trading schemes encouraged invest-
ment in unsustainable activities. 
6) Part of the “good life” involved meaningful and re-
warding work and we should look to stimulate low car-
bon or no carbon industries that would provide such 
work. Carbon taxes would help promote low carbon in-
dustries.  
In the intervening decade, I have not returned to this 
theme in the same holistic way although some elements 
have been included in other papers and publications and 
new arguments made about the advantages of a “carbon 
added tax” and similarities between the problems of wa-
ter trading and carbon trading [1,2]. However, I have 
continued to suggest that the centrality of conceptions of 
the good life to addressing climate change within the 
United Nations University and Griffith University. As a 
result, the World Institute for Development Economics 
Research (UNU-WIDER initiated discussions on the 
theme and the Griffith Institute for Social and Behav-
ioural Research (GISBR) chose this theme for its launch 
conference. My paper was later published as the lead 
essay in a special edition of the Australian Journal of 
Social Issues [3]. In setting out these ideas and their in-
teraction with globalization and the global financial crisis 
(GFC), the discussion of each will necessarily be brief.  
2. Globalization and Governance 
Over the last twenty years, the flow of money, goods, 
people and ideas across borders has threatened to over-
whelm the system of sovereign states. Much activity has 
moved outside the control of nation states at the same 
time as nation states have “deregulated” and “privat-
ized”.4 Such policies have transferred power from those 
exercising governmental power at the nominal behest of 
the majority of its citizens to those with greater wealth or 
greater knowledge in markets in which knowledge is 
typically asymmetric and in which power is distributed 
on a very different basis of one dollar one value rather 
than one vote one value. 
It is now recognised that many governance problems 
have arisen because of globalization and can only be ad-
dressed by global solutions [4]. It must also be recog-
nized that governance problems at the national level con-
tribute to governance problems and the global level and 
vice versa. This is true of current issues from the melting 
Greenland glaciers to the ethical and financial meltdown 
of Wall Street. In both cases, there are glaring and mutu-
ally reinforcing weaknesses in global governance institu-
tions, national governance institutions, and corporations. 
In the case of the financial crisis, there have been sig-
nificant failures of professions and those whose advice is 
trusted. From the ratings agencies, to corporations, to 
superannuation funds, to banks, to governments and mul-
tilateral agencies, institutions must be redesigned to in-
crease the probability that they will use the power en-
trusted in them to serve the public interest in the way 
they claim. With climate change there have been serial 
and mutually reinforcing failures in global governance 
(as seen in Copenhagen), national governance (with fail-
ures to agree on the extent of the problem and the means 
for addressing it) and corporate governance (from short 
termism to green-wash). However, if we are going to 
demand that institutions are to serve our interests and 
values, it is critical that we are clear to ourselves what 
our values are and how those values are integrated into 
our view of the good life and that of our actions as citi-
zens, consumers and investors. 
3. Carbon, Climate Change and 
Unsustainable Versions of the “Good Life” 
Unlike the increasing flows of money, goods, people and 
ideas across national borders that constitute the heart of 
globalization, carbon flows across borders independently 
of human action. It is a headline issue because all of the 
above-mentioned global flows have exacerbated climate 
change, and because solutions involve global agreement 
on goals and the creation of untried institutional mecha-
nisms. If global warming is to be halted this century, 
total emissions have to be capped and cut and all states 
will have to participate in securing that outcome.  
However, the fundamental driver of our climate prob-
lems is arguably the incipient spread of an unsustainable 
Western version of the “good life”. Resource-intensive, 
high-carbon, western lifestyles are frequently criticized 
4Deregulation has generally preceded “privatization”—though the at-
tempted privatisation of natural monopolies has required a high degree of 
regulation which the former movement rubbished as ineffective. 
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as unsustainable and deeply unsatisfying, and yet it 
would appear that their ethical legitimacy has been estab- 
lished by the adoption of a bowdlerized version of utili-
tarianism that its most famous exponents would have 
derided. Jeremy Bentham himself believed in a form of 
utilitarianism that maximised, but which applied to eve-
ryone equally, and which included a very important prin-
ciple—the principle of diminishing marginal utility [5]. 
The first loaf of bread makes one happy, the second loaf 
of bread does not add to one’s happiness nearly as much 
as the first and the third may be positively unhealthy. Of 
course, it is hard to measure utility directly, so many de-
cide to measure dollars (which until derivatives were 
easy to count) rather than utility or happiness,5 ignore the 
equalizing role of diminishing marginal utility. This ar-
guably leads to a “dollarised” (or “dolorized”!) version 
of the good life that is not “good” and may not be much 
of a life. However, whether by good marketing or bad 
habits, these lifestyles are still attractive to the majority 
of westerners and to a high proportion of the developing6 
world’s middle classes. In so doing, northern profligacy 
has become southern aspiration. Even if confined to the 
West such lifestyles are unsustainable: their extension to 
the rest of the world increases the downward spiral to 
ecological catastrophe. Since the 1970s, there have been 
many pleas for western nations to desist from unsustain-
able aspects of their lifestyle and more ascetic lifestyles 
have been advocated. While some will choose less en-
ergy intensive and environmentally damaging versions of 
the goods and services they desire, self-denial has rarely 
been widely popular among those who can indulge 
themselves, and the numbers pursuing unsustainable life-
styles has increased over the last 30 years rather than 
decreased. In sum, the key problem is that the West has 
invented and proselytized an unsustainable version of the 
“good life” that other countries seek to emulate [2,6]. 
There can be no solution to climate change until sus-
tainable conceptions of the good life are developed that 
Westerners want to live and which others might want to 
adopt. A dialogue between East and West might be very 
instructive in imagining such conceptions of the good life. 
Fortunately, many of the things that human beings value 
most do not require huge investments of energy and an 
unsustainable use of resources—for example: compan-
ionship, conviviality, conversation. None of Martha Nu- 
ssbaum’s extensive list of human values—to take one 
prominent example of the emerging broader and deeper 
approach to these questions—need break the ecological 
bank [7]. Other alternatives based on maintaining the 
unsustainable western lifestyles (the evaluative status 
quo), including coercing low-emitting countries to cap 
their carbon emissions (which is not possible even if it 
were morally acceptable) and paying those countries to 
cap their emissions (which is self defeating while unsus-
tainable images of the good life prevail, because one way 
or another, those being paid to live more sustainable life-
styles will seek the unsustainable “good life”) lack plau-
sibility. A third possibility is that elites in less developed 
countries will be induced to commit their countries to cap 
their emissions. While there is a long tradition of such 
corrupt deals, they should not be contemplated here be-
cause they are unsustainable for both parties to such 
deals.  
4. Concerns about Carbon Trading Schemes 
While the ultimate solution to climate change is the de-
velopment of low carbon lifestyles, it is important that 
economic incentives support and stimulate that search. 
The sustainable versions of the good life provide an 
ethical pull. The incentives provide an economic push. 
The currently favoured approach is to set a cap and then 
cut total emissions with the trading of emission rights to 
provide incentives to those who can most efficiently cut 
their carbon and minimize the cost. This approach is un-
surprisingly popular in states emitting the most carbon 
because it effectively gives them a property right to 
emit,7 something that is acknowledged in the literature.8 
However, where an activity is shown to be harmful and 
unsustainable, it is not immediately obvious that the ap-
propriate response is to create property rights to continue 
the harmful activity and to give the greatest property 
rights to those countries or corporations who have done 
the most harm and have been externalising the costs on 
others who have suffered and continue to suffer from the 
harm done. This idea is popular in the West and with 
those who would profit by the operation of those markets. 
It is unpopular with non-Western countries which would 
be given less rights. Indeed, why would they agree? 
Those who spent the last decade worrying about how to 
persuade the USA to take part do not seem to have ap-
preciated this obvious objection and seemed to be sur-
prised at the forcefulness of developing countries in the 
lead-up to Copenhagen. 
5Demand and supply curves may recognize that the rich man does not 
value the third loaf of bread but does not recognize that the fact that the 
poor values the first loaf even more and certainly much more than the 
rich man’s next transient treat. 
6I use the term “developing” rather than “less developed”, “low in-
come” or “very low income” despite what is sometimes seen as a neo-
liberal bias in the term. First, the term predates neo-liberalism. Second, 
and more importantly, I still maintain the view that we need to develop 
the economies and polities of the world to allow individuals to take part 
in the good life through the development of their capabilities and 
through delivery of material and non-material goods. 
7A new right that appears in no declarations and in no texts-but which 
is proclaimed by some Westerners. 
8Issuing permits free of charge (or at low cost) explicitly recognizes the 
property rights which emitters have had in the past [8]. 
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Wherever large amounts of assets are found, so will 
there be attempts to appropriate them. When a very large 
body of assets is created, the temptation/corruption risk is 
correspondingly, very large. This point is frequently 
made about carbon offsets (for example, Daphne Wy-
sham at a plenary session of the 14th IACC). However, 
the value of the carbon permits is likely to be several 
times that of offsets. If they are all auctioned, this may be 
less of a problem. But most proposals suggest giving 
away most of these valuable assets. If these permits go to 
the major polluting corporations and companies, it will 
be the greatest private appropriation of public assets 
since the Russian privatisations of the early 1990s—ex-
cept they will be global in scope.  
This approach of creating property rights in unsus-
tainable activities also has the perverse effect of encour-
aging market players to look for the next unsustainable 
activity in which they can invest to benefit from “grand 
fathered” rights. It will then be in their interests to maxi-
mise the harmful activity to maximise the property rights 
given when the harm is recognized. This approach re-
wards polluters, exacerbates pollution and creates per-
verse incentives for those who know about pollution to 
invest in it rather than expose it. Faith in such markets 
may be misplaced in this case, just as it is being sorely 
tested in the current global economic crisis. The relevant 
commodity—carbon—is not well understood, and know- 
ledge will thus be asymmetric, allowing market players 
many opportunities for arbitrage and taking advantage of 
the ignorance of those who need to access the market to 
continue their businesses. This process leads to increased 
costs and risks of doing business (as the market for car-
bon can fluctuate wildly)9 so that much of the extra cost 
of doing business will end up in the hands of market 
players rather than consumers or producers who have to 
pay higher prices. There is also the possibility that eve-
rybody loses. New markets often get it wrong.  
5. “Beware of Merchant Banks Bearing Gifts” 
The creators and “market makers” for derivatives were 
very keen to enter into carbon trading. While many are 
wary of entrusting them with the contents of their piggy 
banks, it is unlikely that they will be entrusted with the 
future of the planet: there are many fresh and vivid 
memories of the way in which new markets are prone to 
fluctuation and profiteering from asymmetric knowledge. 
In promoting volatility, traders benefited at the ex- 
pense of those who needed to exchange currencies to 
conduct business through a combination of asymmetric 
knowledge and outright manipulation. Although some 
risks could be hedged (generating major profits for the 
market players), long term risk was uninsurable. By in-
creasing the risk of doing other business, it discouraged 
what would be an otherwise profitable investment. It is 
almost universally true that stability is good for industry, 
volatility is good for traders.10 Those who will cash in on 
the volatility are rent seekers, pushing inefficient finan-
cial structures that will provide them with profits. 
The more enthusiastic merchant bankers are about 
carbon trading the more we should be wary of it. I can 
see why believers in the efficient markets hypothesis, 
strengthened by the success of SO2 trading schemes 
might have been enthusiastic for carbon trading schemes 
in the past. However, the experience of the GFC with 
complex financial instruments should make us very wary 
of trying to create a complex market for current and fu-
ture carbon credits. While CDOs, CDFs and ETFs once 
looked solid and now look virtual (sometimes in the 
sense of being non-existent), future carbon credits may 
seem just so much “hot air”. I tend to think that if the 
GFC had preceded the Rio Conference, nobody would 
have suggested carbon trading. Now that we have seen 
the effects of the GFC, it is strange that it has persisted so 
long. 
6. Revisiting Carbon Taxes in a New Form: 
“Carbon Added Tax” 
The clearest alternative approach to carbon trading in-
volves the taxation of unsustainable activity rather than 
granting rights to it. I would suggest a “carbon added 
tax” (CAT) to operate like a value added tax (VAT). If a 
CAT operates like a VAT, carbon taxes will be “passed 
on up the line” until they are ultimately paid by the con-
sumer of the relevant goods and services. The VAT 
10My understanding of this is not merely theoretical. I have been a Di-
rector of a medium sized family company importing high end white 
goods into Australia since 1976. During the 1980s the extreme volatility 
of currency markets rendered obsolete our previous policies for ad-
dressing the risks of currency changes. Australia’s then Treasurer 
showed how little he knew (as opposed to purporting to know) when he 
said that the speculators would, from then on, speculate against each 
other. Their prime target was, of course, those who had to engage in 
currency transactions. The bankers came forward with various expensive 
hedging products that would protect us from the risks that their own 
trading created and told me that everyone was taking a position on the 
market—whether or not they covered or did not cover. My response was 
indignant. I was not in the business of taking a position; I was in the 
business of importing white goods. They were imposing risks on that 
business and then offering insurance against that risk. It was a form of 
protection racket. Following this event, I decided to actively manage the 
exchange exposure by opening accounts in DM and USD (the currencies 
in which we purchased most of our goods) and chose when to switch to 
Australian dollars and, frequently, to switch USD to DM). In the end, I 
made quite a bit of money by switching DM debts to USD debts and 
riding the interest rate differentials until the USD fell from the ridiculous 
and unsustainable heights it had reached in 1986-1987. The profits from 
this strategy tided our company over the fall out from the stock market 
crash of 1987 which I, like many, predicted in substance but not timing.
9I recognize that the European carbon market has settled down so that the 
maximum prices are only about double the minimum prices and that 
these make it less volatile than many commodity prices. However, there 
are many artificial aspects of the European carbon market, including the 
fact that most of the carbon permits required by those who need them are 
given them for free. 
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treatment of imports means that those who keep outside 
the system of carbon taxes would still face the CAT 
when the goods are imported into a market within the 
system.11 It also means that the burden is on those coun-
tries which consume high carbon goods and services 
rather than those who produce them.12 
This strategy involves the harnessing of the power of 
markets—though by using a direct and controlled price 
signal which inhibits high carbon industries and stimulate 
low carbon industries and provides clear signals to where 
future entrepreneurs can make their fortunes. It closes off 
two other ways in which individuals and corporations 
can make money—through lobbying (and worse) to get 
free carbon credits or through leveraging asymmetric 
knowledge and resources to profit from an immature 
market.  
As indicated above, volatility is good for traders and 
not for those engaging in long term business decisions. A 
decision to adopt a carbon tax over a carbon trading 
scheme provides incentives to channel entrepreneurial 
talent into the new industries without which we cannot 
grow our economies in ways that provide a sustainable 
good life for this planet’s peoples. The next group of 
great entrepreneurs are those who will have new ideas of 
how sustainably to provide goods and services that con-
sumers want in ways that provide a decent living for 
those who work in them. This approach will involve new 
ways of providing old goods and services and new goods 
and services that meet human needs. A decision to adopt 
carbon trading makes investment in low carbon indus-
tries more risky by reducing the certainty of the price 
advantage that sustainable goods and services can be 
provided. In so doing, it increases the required rate of 
return for the investment to be made.  
If imports and exports are dealt within the same way 
as GST/VAT, it is possible to introduce it in a single 
country without affecting that country’s competitiveness. 
CAT would be levied on all imports and a CAT credit 
given for all exports. Accordingly, goods and services 
produced within Australia would not be at a disadvantage 
against imports in our own markets or against goods and 
services in other markets. This approach emphasises that 
it is the consumption of high carbon products and ser-
vices that is the problem and that the burden should fall 
on the consumers rather than the producers. This reflects 
the genuine (but rarely expressed) concern that countries 
which produce high carbon goods or components are 
treated as just as much of the problem as those who con-
sume them. Much of the manufacturing, mining and 
smelting that was once done in the West is now done, for 
example, in China or Australia. A carbon tax will address 
both consumption and production but the burden of a 
carbon tax should be on the ultimate consumers not the 
producers. This approach does not remove the price in-
centive from producers as high carbon products will be 
less competitive in export markets.  
I note that it could be argued that price elasticity 
within countries means that the ultimate consumers will 
not pay—something that is rarely argued for VAT. How- 
ever, as each country imposes a tax on the carbon in-
cluded within imports, it becomes certain that the coun-
tries whose populations consume the most carbon inten-
sive goods and services will have to pay. Concerns of the 
inflationary effects such a tax or the increase in govern- 
ment revenues can be addressed by returning revenue to 
individuals through cuts in consumption tax (either 
across the board or targeted to produce more socially 
equitable outcomes—for example, zero-rating classes of 
goods typically consumed by lower income groups). A 
CAT provides both negative and positive price signals as 
low carbon products actually decline in price (though 
slowly enough to avoid deflation of low carbon products). 
In general, the point is that there should be a move from 
taxing consumption to taxing carbon. The gradual sub-
stitution of carbon for standard consumption taxes pro-
vides room for huge price signals and incentives for re-
ducing green house and other emissions without affecting 
inflation. (However, in countries where there is a risk of 
deflation, the inflationary effects might be particularly 
valuable to keep the general price level increasing. The 
proceeds could then be distributed to citizens or residents 
as a per capita payment).  
If CAT rose to replace consumption taxes at current 
rates (10 - 25 percent are typical leading to revenue from 
the tax at between 5 - 15 percent of GST), the price sig-
nal could be made much greater than the carbon trading 
schemes contemplated. The government could announce 
a schedule of carbon tax increases over the next decade 
with a warning that the rate will be increased until carbon 
consumption was reduced to sustainable levels. This ap-
proach has the virtue of allowing industries to change, 
providing predictability but a clear message that the gov-
ernment has the determination and a relatively easy 
means to increase taxes on carbon until emissions targets 
are met. As carbon taxes became more effective, the 
CAT take might shrink and VAT could then be gradually 
11Some might question how the carbon emitted in producing imports is 
calculated. This is a reasonable question—though the question of meas-
urement is an issue for goods produced locally and for carbon trading 
systems as well. The answer for carbon taxes is a simple one. The 
carbon emitted by producing particular classes of goods would be 
estimated on the basis of traditional practice and it would be open to 
any importer (or manufacturer) to demonstrate that they emit less car-
bon than that standard. If the cost of proving the lower carbon emis-
sions is greater than the tax benefits to be gained, then they will run 
with the estimate.  
12It is a concern is that countries which produce high carbon goods or 
components are treated as just as much of the problem as those who 
consume them.  
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returned without any effect on inflation or taxation as a 
share of national income. 
The distributional effects of carbon taxes do need to be 
considered. They are likely to be regressive in developed 
countries where the poor tend to live away from city cen-
tres, their work and public transport. This is certainly the 
case in Australia where the poorer Australians now live 
in outer suburbs and are more dependent on motor vehi-
cle transport. This is one reason why it is important that 
taxes that are cut should be regressive taxes (like GST) 
rather than progressive taxes such as income tax. 
7. Institutional Reform 
If we are going to secure sustainable low carbon life-
styles, we need more than the ethical pull and the eco-
nomic push. Each needs to be institutionalized-built into 
the governance of global, regional, national, sub- re-
gional, corporate and professional institutions. Where we 
currently see the weakness in each exacerbating the 
weaknesses in others, we need governance reform in all 
areas supporting sustainable, low carbon versions of the 
good life.  
Attempts to avoid future Global Financial Crises re-
quire institutional reform at several levels:  
 Global (for example, strengthening G20, mobilizing 
the UN and its “unique legitimacy”, Basle accords);  
 Regional (for example, ECB);  
 National and sub-national (where most banking, com-
petition and financial regulation are managed);  
 Professional (existing professions like law and account-
ing must ensure that their services are not used to de-
fraud and add risk; wannabe professional like banking 
and finance must recognize that professions involve the 
application of an area of specialist knowledge to further 
the interests of the community they claim to serve thro- 
ugh achieving clear public goods—indeed, they have to 
recognize that finance is a service industry that serves 
rather than seeks to profit at the expense of the rest of the 
community); 
 Corporate (corporations need to remember that the 
reason why we have not heeded Adam Smith’s warn-
ings about merchants gathering together and instead 
made incorporation much easier is because they have 
argued that corporations benefit the communities in 
which they operate. Corporations and their executives 
must not only repeat this claim but ensure that it is 
true—first, as a matter of integrity and second, be-
cause of their “licence to operate” along with the 
privileges of incorporation and limited liability. All 
concentrations of power can lead to abuse of that 
power—something that Smith’s American contem-
poraries recognized in governments and which Smith 
recognized in corporations). 
Similarly, avoiding the impending Global Carbon Cri-
sis requires reform at all those levels: 
 Global (the post-Copenhagen process, international 
treaties on carbon and relevant cash transfers, the 
utilization of the unique legitimacy of the UN, Global 
Compact, Principles of Responsible Investment, the 
Earth Charter—and above all through the promotion 
of cross-cultural dialogue on sustainable versions of 
the good life); 
 Regional (regional organizations need to collaborate 
on environmental issues and in assisting each other to 
cope with climate change and environmental refu-
gees); 
 National (through the establishment of carbon taxes— 
or carbon trading if they must); 
 Professional (existing professions such as law, ac-
counting and engineering should seek to build and 
apply their specialist knowledge bases so that they 
can assist their clients not only comply with environ-
mental laws but become ethical entrepreneurs, seek-
ing new ways to reduce the carbon emissions associ-
ated with their activity); 
 Corporate (corporations need to serve their communi-
ties and themselves by finding goods and services that 
support a sustainable good life for their customers, 
employees and shareholders—applying their entre-
preneurship to developing new low carbon, zero car-
bon and negative carbon industries); 
 These reforms will include institutions at various lev-
els that measure carbon emissions for taxing and/or 
trading and carbon abatements for trading schemes.  
The importance of good institutional governance is 
recognised by many disciplines which might make a con- 
tribution to institutional governance and reform. The 
problem is not that it is ignored: the problem is that each 
discipline has a strongly theorised but limited conception 
of institutions, which colours and structures their view of 
the nature of institutional problems and the best means 
for addressing them. For example, lawyers look at insti-
tutions and see sets of formal norms, ethicists see infor-
mal norms and the values the institution claims to further, 
economists see incentives and disincentives, political 
scientists see power relations, social psychologists see 
complex webs of interpersonal and group relationships, 
and management theorists see structures and systems. 
Accordingly, the problems are seen in the deficiency of 
laws, ethical standards, incentives, power relations, sys-
tems, and so on, and the solutions are seen as lying in 
remedying those specific deficiencies.  
All these partial insights into institutions and their 
problems are important and any solution that ignores 
them is likely to fail. However, as proffered solutions 
tend to be developed from only one disciplinary perspec-
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tive, they are necessarily limited, perhaps over-emph- 
asising legislative solutions or the impact of economic 
incentives. As indicated above, this was not a problem 
when Smith and Bentham were writing. However, the 
explosion of literature within each of the relevant disci-
plines means that we need strong interdisciplinary teams 
with mutual understanding and respect for what their 
disciplines can contribute if we are going to provide in-
sights into how these institutional reforms may be 
achieved. 
8. Integrity Systems 
It is now widely recognized that improving governance 
and combating corruption should not be entrusted to any 
single institution, single law or single methodology. It is 
now recognized that such goals are best achieved by a 
variety of institutions (for example, governmental, cor-
porate, professional, NGOs). These institutions will sup-
port each other when they are performing their role 
within the integrity system and check each other if they 
do not.  
I have argued over the past two years that dealing with 
the GFC and avoiding the GCC similarly require a range 
of institutional responses at global, regional, national, 
sub-national, corporate, professional and NGO levels. 
We should map the current global financial integrity sys-
tem and global carbon integrity system to identify what 
institutions are operating, their strengths, weaknesses and 
the degree to which they are mutually supportive (see my 
discussion of integrity systems and at the 12th IACC) [1]. 
We should then examine where those integrity systems 
can be improved—through adding new institutions, str- 
engthening existing institutions and developing stronger 
links between them.  
9. North-South Financial Flows 
Because the North has contributed most to the problem, 
built its wealth on high carbon activities and will con-
tinue to do so until we reduce carbon emissions to sus-
tainable levels, it is recognized by most that transfers of 
resources from the North to the South will be required. 
This was part of the flawed thinking behind carbon trad-
ing and behind the Copenhagen discussions of interna-
tional climate change finance.  
There are genuine concerns that there will be corrup-
tion in this process: 
1) If we adopt carbon trading, bogus carbon credits 
will be created; 
2) If we transfer funds to developing countries, will 
these be siphoned off by elites who exercise dispropor-
tionate power (and incidentally tend to use just as much 
carbon as the elites of developed nations); 
3) If the west controls the funds, they may be used for 
their own purposes. In any case, such transfers are not a 
matter of charity but of compensation. It is a way of say-
ing thank you for not destroying the planet in the same 
way as we have been doing, and thank you for not dam-
aging it as much as we will be doing over the next few 
years. 
These problems will need to be addressed by integrity 
systems as discussed above. However, I would argue that 
the ultimate answer is that the carbon tax is returned to 
individuals. If sustainable carbon emissions total, say, 
two tonnes of carbon per person, then each individual 
should receive a payment equal to the tax on two tonnes 
of carbon each year. These refunds should be in pay-
ments to individuals rather than governments to ensure 
that they get through to those who need to benefit. It also 
reflects the fact that the poorest people in the world are 
generally in the most corrupt and undemocratic of socie-
ties whose governments are least likely to pass on the 
benefits of any carbon windfall. Ultimately, a more am-
bitious model might be considered in which a number of 
taxes become globally collected. These are made up of 
taxes that are increasingly uncollectible at a national 
level (for example, company tax and death duties) and 
those that should be imposed at a global level for sys-
temic reasons (carbon taxes, Tobin tax, taxes on re-
sources taken from the sea outside of national economic 
zones). These could be collected together and provide a 
“Global Minimum Income” for all persons on the planet. 
This approach would follow the logic of “Basic Income” 
and “Guaranteed Minimum Income” schemes which rec-
ognize a right to resources based on citizenship and a 
duty to pay taxes based on economic activity. The value 
of the distribution would be limited in the richest coun-
tries but would have the potential to be totally trans-
forming in poorer ones. This approach may be some time 
off, but an approach like this to handling any north-south 
cash transfers might not only be just but may ultimately 
be required to secure the genuine consent of the governed 
in developing countries.  
I appreciate that the logic of collective action (and the 
reasons we have and need governments) is that some 
things cannot be done by individuals or at least not as 
effectively. However, where collective action and re-
sources are not deployed for community benefit but by 
those who have captured the state, it might be better to 
transfer those funds to individuals. If governments want 
to deploy those funds for collective goods, they must 
persuade the citizenry to agree to transfer their money to 
the government. If governments are not prepared to dis-
tribute the funds to individuals, there will be no North- 
South transfer. While conditionality may be challenged 
generally and in particular for carbon transfers, this par-
ticular form of conditionality is hardly one that will lead 
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to objections by the citizenry. Indeed, if the government 
refuses to accept the funds because it will be passed on 
the citizens, this decision will add to their unpopularity. 
If they cannot persuade their citizens to transfer these 
funds to them, then they probably do not have a better 
use for it.  
There are other emerging global problems in competi-
tion for land between growing food, growing biofuels 
and growing plantation timber for carbon sinks. All this 
has happened before—in taking over land for cash crops 
in developing countries in the late nineteenth and much 
of the twentieth century, and earlier for enclosures. The 
use of land for more lucrative pursuits is presumably 
justified if those who would have otherwise secured food 
from the relevant land get enough of the benefits to buy 
food from other sources. Yet, sometimes the efficiency is 
merely gained from producing less value but with less 
labour—for example, plantation timber versus intensive 
farming—which may be a benefit to the landowner but 
not necessarily to society (where total GDP is reduced). 
We must avoid solutions in which unsustainable western 
lifestyles are preserved by taking over food growing land 
that would otherwise feed the world’s poor. As indicated 
above, however, the ultimate answer is that the carbon 
tax is returned to individuals.  
10. Financial Globalization and Sustainable 
Globalization 
If globalization involves the flow of people, ideas, goods 
and money, the last has grown most rapidly—indeed, 
well in excess of the flow of goods and investment that it 
is supposed to support. Developing countries have en-
trusted their enormous and growing surpluses in western 
banks and other financial intermediaries. Some, such as 
East Timor, have been pressed by western run multi- 
laterals to entrust the proceeds of extractive industries in 
Wall Street on the basis that it was less likely to be 
eroded by corruption. The amounts entrusted to such 
intermediaries in the US and elsewhere on the basis that 
they would be invested on a secure and conservative ba-
sis were unprecedented. It now appears that entrusted 
powers over vast sums of money were abused for per-
sonal gain. Many within financial intermediaries have 
played with that money in ways that maximized their 
fees while increasing the risks to their investors. The 
ratings practices were scandalous and incredibly insult-
ing to well run businesses and governments whose risk 
was far less than 110 percent non-recourse mortgages on 
inflated values to NINJA borrowers (no income, no job, 
no assets). The fact that their risk models were based on 
the probabilities of individual defaults and ignored the 
possibility of an overall decline in property markets is 
merely more evidence of incompetence, negligence and 
“arrogance beyond their means”. Once such ratings could 
be secured, the signing up of mortgagees, the packaging 
of those loans, their rating and their sale to local citizens 
and foreigners looks like a well oiled “corruption sys-
tem”. Even though they did not see themselves as corrupt, 
several parties were maximizing their fees while squan-
dering profits at the expense of those who entrusted them 
with their funds. The unedifying subsequent sharp shift 
from greed to blind panic only adds to the contempt that 
so many have engendered.  
In reforming the international financial system, a new 
goal should be affirmed—ensuring that those who are 
entrusted with investing funds for others do not abuse 
that entrusted power to increase their wealth at the ex-
pense of those for whom they invest. This goal does not 
mean that banks should not be rescued. The fact that they 
were poorly run is not the point. If they had been well 
run, they would not need to be rescued. Rescues are in-
stigated to protect the wider economy, business confi-
dence and depositors who were not accepting suspi-
ciously high rates—while seeking to ensure that the own-
ers and managers of such banks remain as exposed as 
possible to the consequences of their mistakes. Neither 
does this mean that all participants acted unethically or 
illegally. However, if confidence in the international fi-
nancial system is to be restored in the long term, and if 
the proceeds of developing country surpluses and west-
ern superannuation funds are to continue to be entrusted 
with intermediaries for investment in the globalized 
economy—thereby supporting sustainable globalization 
rather than undermining it, then, this can only happen if 
there is a full investigation of what went wrong and op-
tions for the establishment of adequate financial integrity 
systems are debated, selected and implemented as part of 
the Global Integrity System. Such an investigation will 
have to include members of developing as well as de-
veloped countries and be supported by the work of inter-
national researchers, NGOs and international organiza-
tions. In this process, the Equator Principles, the UN 
Global Compact, the UN Principles of Responsible In-
vestment will need to be reconsidered and implemented. 
11. Recognising the Multiple Roles of 
Individual 
While the architecture of sustainable global governance 
and sustainable globalization is largely institutional, we 
should never ignore the individual dimension. We should 
identify our own actions that can further stated good 
governance values. We must recognize that we can act at 
three levels: as citizens, as investors, and as consumers. 
When we act, we have responsibility for the consequ- 
ences of our actions. The fact that we are acting as con-
sumers and investors does not excuse us from that re-
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sponsibility. However, between our actions and the achi- 
evement of intended consequences lie a number of insti-
tutions: as citizens we rely on political parties, parlia-
ments and bureaucracies to implement our collective 
choices; as investors, we rely on advisors, trust funds, 
fund managers and corporations to connect our values 
with our investments; and, as consumers we rely on man- 
ufacturers, service providers, retailers and advertisers to 
inform our choices and deliver them. We empower these 
institutions by voting, investing and consuming. We must 
recognize that those institutions may well abuse that 
power. Accordingly, we should demand institutional 
changes to limit the ability of those institutions to abuse 
the power entrusted to them.  
We should recognize that action on one front can af-
fect action on other fronts and campaigns should press 
for action on all three fronts. We should especially seek 
to harness the ultimate owners of most corporations— 
superannuants. The latter have been actively discouraged 
from thinking of themselves as having any interests or 
values—effectively, and insultingly, required to be “eco-
nomic man”. Their interests, however, are long term and 
not confined to the market return on their investments. 
They have other economic interests as employees, tax-
payers and parents. An action that marginally increases 
the return on their investments but raises unemployment 
or requires taxpayer funded clean-ups or bailouts is 
against their overall economic interests. The best entre-
preneurs are those who build sustainable businesses; but 
a large part of the problem has been that the financial 
intermediaries who handle superannuants’ money are 
driven by short term incentives. 
Investors also have values that go beyond economic 
interests. They are not only entitled to seek to further 
these values through their investments but are responsi-
ble for their choices. Shareholders’ values may vary but 
this merely means that funds should differentiate them-
selves on the basis of the values they seek to further. As 
most superannuation funds aim for diverse investments 
and align shareholdings with stock market indices, su-
perannuants are becoming “universal investors”. Any 
attempt by businesses to externalize their costs hurts an-
other one of the superannuant’s investments—and often the 
superannuants themselves. Accordingly, the externaliza-
tion of costs is not a game that superannuants can afford 
and neither they, nor the funds who invest their money, 
should be willing to play. There is a direct line between 
ethical and socially responsible investment by individu-
als, funds adopting and implementing the UN Principles 
of Responsible Investment, and corporate social respon-
sibility initiatives such as the Global Compact [9]. 
12. Concluding Remarks 
There will always be a role for markets. Their dynamic 
power allows us to trade what we have for what we would 
prefer. While this power may be harnessed to serve our 
interests, untrammelled markets will not do so. Adam 
Smith famously wrote: “It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest” 
[10]. It might equally be said that it is not the malevo-
lence of the mortgage broker that writes the NINJA loan 
or the ratings agency that anoints it “AAA”. It is not the 
malevolence of the arms manufacturer that invents the 
cluster bomb or the polluter who destroys the planet. It is 
from their regard for their own self interest. Self interest 
is an important driver but there are some other critical 
variables or preconditions that determine whether self 
interest is channelled to put food on our plantation timber 
table or cluster bombs in an overheated and flood prone 
backyard that has been repossessed by a zombie bank.  
Capitalism must be made to serve the interests of the 
communities in which it operates by making it respon-
sive to the real values of the real people who own most 
of it rather than the values of those who manage our 
money in ways that maximise fee generating transactions. 
The year 2009 was the 250th anniversary of the book that 
Adam Smith regarded as his most important and which 
provided the essential grounding for the Wealth of Na-
tions. The Theory of Moral Sentiments [11] is now con-
sidered primarily to concern moral philosophy and the 
latter economics, so that some might say that moral phi-
losophy or ethics is prior to and more important than 
economics. Yet Smith would not have said that. He and 
his philosophical contemporaries lived before the separa-
tion of disciplines and, like Jeremy Bentham, Smith 
would have seen little point in separating the modern 
disciplines of law, ethics, politics and economics whose 
separate formation post-dated their work and their in-
sights [12,13]. Governance requires their reintegration 
and their service to those our institutions are supposed to 
serve—us [1,14,15]. At the same time, we need to think 
through our values, integrate those values into our own 
conception of the good life and then integrate our actions 
as citizens, consumers and investors so that we may, in 
fact, live sustainable conceptions of the good life.  
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